Launched on June 2, 2022, by the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Police Specialised Services Automation Project (POSSAP) promises to streamline access to specialised police services like Police Character Certificates, Tint Permits, and Specialised Escort Services through its online portal.
Touted as a move toward transparency and efficiency, POSSAP requires citizens to submit biometric data, such as fingerprints, for certain services.
However, in a country already awash with biometric databases (NIN, BVN, passports, and more), POSSAP’s approach raises a critical question: why is Nigeria adding yet another layer of biometric collection instead of unifying existing systems?

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POSSAP’s biometric mandate
POSSAP aims to modernise police services by automating processes that were previously manual and prone to corruption.
For services like Police Character Certificates, essential for visa applications or employment, applicants must visit designated police registries for biometric capture after submitting online requests. While this reduces physical bureaucracy, the requirement for new biometric data duplicates efforts already undertaken by other agencies.
The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) collects fingerprints, facial recognition, and iris scans for the 11-digit NIN, which over 100 million Nigerians have enrolled for since 2007.
Similarly, the BVN, managed by the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS), captures fingerprints and photos for banking purposes, while the Nigerian Immigration Service collects biometrics for passports.


This redundancy is glaring. A citizen applying for a Police Character Certificate may have already submitted biometrics multiple times, yet POSSAP does not integrate with these existing databases.
The lack of interoperability forces Nigerians to repeatedly endure long queues, travel costs, and privacy risks, all while agencies operate in silos. Public sentiment reflects frustration with this inefficiency, and users have questioned why NIN data, designed as a universal identifier, isn’t leveraged to streamline processes like POSSAP’s.
For emphasis, Nigeria’s identity management landscape is a patchwork of overlapping systems. The NIN, intended as a centralised identifier, was meant to harmonise data across agencies, yet its adoption remains incomplete.
The BVN, introduced in 2014, links financial transactions but is inaccessible to non-banking agencies like the NPF. Passports, voter cards, and even driver’s licences each require separate biometric enrollments, creating a web of redundant databases.
A 2024 World Bank report on digital identity systems noted that Nigeria’s lack of data integration hinders service delivery and increases costs for citizens, with an estimated 542 million Africans, including millions in Nigeria, still lacking unified legal identification.
POSSAP’s biometric requirement exemplifies this fragmentation. Instead of querying NIN or BVN databases to verify identities, the NPF has opted to build a parallel system, raising concerns about inefficiency and data security.
The Foundation for Investigative Journalism (FIJ) has reported black-market sales of NIN and BVN data, highlighting vulnerabilities in Nigeria’s data ecosystem. By collecting fresh biometrics, POSSAP risks adding to this pool of sensitive information, potentially exposing citizens to further breaches without robust cybersecurity measures.
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Meanwhile, the 2021 registration of POSSAP Solutions Ltd., the company behind the POSSAP platform, raises questions about the project’s transparency and efficiency.
Established just after the Federal Executive Council approved POSSAP in July 2021, the company, led by CEO Dr. David Ibhawoh, appears to have been created specifically for this initiative. While this aligns with standard public-private partnership models, the lack of public details about the company’s ownership, selection process, or prior track record invites scrutiny, especially in Nigeria’s context of opaque procurement practices.
Compounding this, POSSAP’s failure to integrate with existing biometric databases fuels suspicions that it prioritises revenue generation over efficiency, burdening citizens with redundant processes.
Without transparent evidence of competitive bidding or data-sharing agreements, POSSAP Solutions Ltd.’s role risks being perceived as opportunistic, though no direct evidence of impropriety exists in available records.


Implications include cost, convenience, and trust
The financial and logistical burden on citizens is significant. Biometric capture for POSSAP often requires travel to police registries, which may be poorly equipped or inaccessible, especially in rural areas.
Nigerians have criticised the government for “collecting biometrics like souvenirs” while failing to address data duplication.
For low-income Nigerians, the cost of obtaining a Police Character Certificate, combined with time lost in queues, adds to the strain of navigating multiple identity systems. Moreover, the lack of transparency about how POSSAP’s biometric data is stored or shared fuels distrust. Unlike NIMC, which operates under the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation (NDPR), the NPF’s data governance framework is less clear, raising questions about compliance with privacy laws.
From a governance perspective, POSSAP’s revenue generation model, part of the Federal Government’s Strategic Revenue Growth Initiative, aims to fund police welfare. However, without integration with existing systems, it risks becoming an expensive endeavour for both the state and citizens.
In other words, the cost of maintaining separate biometric databases – hardware, software, and personnel – could be better allocated to unifying NIN as a single point of truth, as envisioned by the World Bank’s ID4D initiative, which has supported Nigeria with funding for digital identity reforms.
The argument here is that POSSAP’s launch could have been an opportunity to showcase Nigeria’s commitment to a unified identity system. By integrating with NIN or BVN databases, the NPF could have reduced costs, minimised citizen inconvenience, and set a precedent for inter-agency collaboration.


Countries like Estonia, with its single digital ID system, demonstrate how centralised databases can streamline services while enhancing security. Nigeria’s regulatory bodies, like the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), have advocated for data harmonisation, yet POSSAP’s standalone approach suggests a disconnect in policy execution.
In conclusion, for POSSAP to fulfil its potential, the NPF must prioritise interoperability, leveraging existing systems to reduce duplication and enhance trust. Until Nigeria unifies its biometric databases, initiatives like POSSAP will remain half-measures: digital progress overshadowed by bureaucratic inertia.





